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Abstract
In a model with heterogenous agents, wage setting by monopoly unions and
monetary policy conducted by a central bank, we show that the duration of nom-
inal wage contracts is u-shaped in the degree of centralization, with intermediate
bargaining systems yielding contracts of shorter duration and thus more ﬂexible
nominal wages than both decentralized and centralized systems. We also ﬁnd the
optimal level of centralization of wage bargaining to be negatively related to the
degree of heterogeneity in the economy. The theoretical predictions of the model
are tested on OECD data. There is empirical support for the main results regarding
contract length, while there is less support for the predictions regarding the level of
centralization.
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11 Introduction
In the Neo-Keynesian literature, nominal rigidity in wages and prices is a crucial element
in explaining employment and output ﬂuctuations over the business cycle (for recent
overviews, see e.g. Taylor, 1999; Woodford and Rotemberg, 1999). In this paper, we
focus on wage rigidities, which, according to recent ﬁndings in Gali, Gertler and Lopez-
Salido (2001a,b), contribute more to macroeconomic ﬂuctuations than price rigidities.
There are a number of explanations for the existence of rigid nominal wages, such as
downward rigidity due to social norms preventing nominal wage cuts (see e.g. Akerlof
and Yellen, 1990), unsynchronized wage setting leading to rigid aggregate nominal wages
(see e.g. Taylor, 1979; Calvo, 1983) and the existence of a contract cost,w h i c hg i v e sr i s e
to ﬁxed nominal wages for a period of time (e.g. Gray, 1976, 1978; Ball, 1987).
The focus of this paper is on contract costs as an explanation of nominal wage rigidity.
The idea in the literature is that negotiating wages is costly, so that it may be optimal
to ﬁx nominal wages for a period of time. However, this comes at a disadvantage, since
the wage rate does not change in response to unexpected events, which causes costly
ﬂuctuations in employment and output. The earlier literature studies how the trade-oﬀ
between reducing the per-period contract cost, on the one hand, and increasing output
and employment ﬂuctuations, on the other hand, is aﬀected by the volatility of both real
and nominal shocks. The contract cost is taken as exogenous in this literature.
In this paper, we argue that contract costs should not be treated as exogenous to the
system within which wages are negotiated. In particular, the hypothesis put forward is
that one important determinant of the size of contract costs is the degree of centraliza-
tion/coordination of wage setting.1 The idea is that the degree of centralization aﬀects
contract length in two opposite ways; an increase in centralization reduces the number of
negotiations that need to be undertaken in the economy, which tends to reduce the total
contract cost, and thereby, reduce contract length. At the same time, coordination can
be costly in itself when various employers and unions have to reach an agreement on a
common stand in wage negotiations. This tends to increase the contract cost, which, in
1The degree of coordination of wage bargaining here refers to the extent to which bargaining is co-
ordinated across industries, unions etc. Examples of coordination can be common expiration dates and
wage norms that set the standard across the economy. Centralization here refers to the level at which
wage bargaining takes place, ranging from decentralized bargaining at the company level, to intermediate
bargaining at the industry level and centralized bargaining with negotiations between nationwide labor
and employers’ federations. See e.g Calmfors et al. (2001) for a discussion of the relationship between
the two concepts of coordination and centralization.
2turn, increases the duration of contracts. The net impact on contract length depends on
the relative strength of these eﬀects, but in the general case, a u-shaped relation between
the degree of centralization and the size of the contract cost should be expected.
The idea that contract costs depend on the degree of centralization has been discussed
by Calmfors et al. (2001) and to some extent, by Murphy (2000), but a more systematic
analysis yet remains to be done.2 The purpose of this paper is therefore to model the link
between the degree of centralization and contract length, and to test the predictions of
the model on data.
The model is based on a setup originally developed by Gray (1978). To model contract
length, we assume that wage rigidities are produced by a contract cost that consists of
both a ﬁxed and a variable part, where the variable part represents the coordination cost
that arises when various unions must reach a common stand. To motivate the coordination
cost, we introduce heterogeneity into the model, which has not been done in the earlier
literature. The motivation is that for a given degree of centralization, coordination costs
should be higher in a more heterogenous society, thereby yielding longer wage contracts.
The introduction of heterogenous agents and a contract cost that depends on the
degree of centralization leads naturally to the question of whether centralization can be
treated as exogenous. So far, this has been the standard assumption in the literature on
wage setting (for overviews, Flanagan, 1999; Calmfors et al., 2001), although the degree of
centralization has been endogenized in some recent work. Holden (2001) models the choice
of coordination as a game where unions decide to coordinate when the gain from doing
so for each union outweigh the beneﬁts from deviating from the coordinated solution.
Holden studies how the trade-oﬀ is aﬀected by the monetary regime and ﬁnds that the
gains from coordination are larger with a more accommodating central bank. Lindbeck
and Snower (2001) discuss the implications of the move from occupational specialization
towards multi-tasking for the degree of centralization of wage setting. They show that
under such re-organization, centralized wage setting becomes ineﬃcient and argue that
this could be a reason for the recent trend towards decentralization in many countries.
Here, we follow this recent line of literature by endogenously modelling the degree of
centralization. We assume that in each wage setting round, the degree of centralization is
2There are some empirical results on the relation between contract length and the size of the bargaining
unit. Murphy (2000) regresses the duration of nominal wage contracts on a set of explanatory variables,
including the number of employees covered by the contract. This variable enters positively but not
signiﬁcantly. Christoﬁdes and Wilton (1983) use two proxies for contract costs: A dummy variable
distinguishing between contracts involving more or less than 1000 employees and a dummy variable
indicating within which industry the contract was signed. They ﬁnd no evidence that these variables
matter for contract length.
3chosen by a union confederation. The confederation chooses the degree of centralization
that maximizes the total utility of the work force belonging to the confederation. Wage-
setting units are then formed and a common wage rate is implemented for all members
of a particular wage-setting unit.3
O n er e s u l ti st h a tf o ras u ﬃciently large ﬁxed contract cost, contract length is u-
shaped in the degree of centralization, with intermediate wage setting systems being more
ﬂexible than both centralized and decentralized systems. Another result of our model is
that the optimal level of centralization is decreasing in the degree of heterogeneity in
the society. The theoretical predictions regarding contract length are supported by data,
using a sample of 17 OECD countries for two time periods. There is less support for the
predictions regarding the degree of centralization.
The structure of the paper is the following. Section 2 gives the basic model. Section
3 analyzes the choice of contract length for a given the degree of centralization. Section 4
models the choice of the degree of centralization. Section 5 performs comparative statics
and section 6 takes the model to the data. Finally, section 7 concludes.
2 The model
2.1 The sequence of the game
In the ﬁrst stage of the game, the degree of centralization is optimally chosen by the union
confederation and local wage-setting units are formed. Thereafter, the wage-setting units
determine a contract specifying a ﬁxed nominal wage rate and contract length. The
productivity level varies during the time of the contract and since the nominal wage is
preset, it cannot be altered in response to productivity changes. The central bank is,
however, able to change the price level and thereby stabilize employment.
The game is repeated and once wage contracts expire, the game starts all over again.
There are no endogenous state variables that link the periods together, which means that
in each period, the agents solve a static problem.4 The model is solved by backward
induction, where the choice of centralization in the ﬁrst stage acts as a constraint for the
second stage choices of contract length and nominal wages.
3Naturally, this is a simpliﬁcation of reality, where the wages implemented diﬀer across ﬁrms and
industries. However, our assumption is intended to capture the fact that wage dispersion tends to be
lower in centralized wage bargaining systems compared to more decentralized ones (see e.g Rowthorn,
1992; or Wallerstein, 1999).
4This means that we focus on history-independent equilibria, which excludes any kind of history-
dependent trigger strategies, such as those analyzed by e.g Holden (2001).
42.2 Production
The private sector consists of a continuum of perfectly competitive ﬁrms, deﬁn e do nt h e
interval 0 <i≤ 1. At each ﬁrm there is a ﬁxed pool of workers attached. The production
function of ﬁrm i is given by
yit = alit + θt + qi, (1)
where yit is the log of output of ﬁrm i at time t, lit is the log of labor input of ﬁrm i at
time t, θt is a productivity shock common to all ﬁrms at time t and qi is an idiosyncratic
component indexing the ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity level. This idiosyncratic component
is constant over time and uniformly distributed on the support [−ρ/2, ρ/2] with density
function ϕ(q)=1 /ρ. The shock θt is a Brownian motion, which is a continuous-time
counterpart of a random walk, with zero mean and instantaneous variance σ2
θ.T h i s
means that the conditional forecast variance of θT at time t, with T>t ,is given by
(T − t)σ2
θ, where the increasing variance over time captures the idea that there is greater
uncertainty about more distant points in the future. The labor share a fulﬁlls 0 <a≤ 1.
For ﬁrm i,p r o ﬁt maximization gives labor demand as
l
d
it = µ(pt − wit + θt + qi +l na), (2)
where µ =1 /(1−a) is the labor demand elasticity, pt is the log of the price level and wit
is the log of the nominal wage. The labor supply of workers in ﬁrm i0s pool is
l
s
it = δ (wit − pt), (3)
where δ ≥ 0.5 We can now deﬁne the eﬃcient level of employment at ﬁrm i in period t
as the employment level at which ld
it = ls







(θt + qi +l na). (4)
In the short run, employment is demand determined. The idea behind this is that
unions determine a nominal wage ﬁxed for a period of time and during the time of the
contract, each worker commits to providing the ﬁrm with the demanded labor. Thus,
during the time of the contract, workers may be oﬀ their labor supply schedule.6
5This type of labor-supply schedule is commonly used in the literature and can be derived from micro-
foundations in a setting where the household’s utility depends positively on consumption and negatively
on the supply of labor.
6This is a common assumption in the literature on contract costs and indexation where the nominal
wage is ﬁx e df o rap e r i o do ft i m e .
52.3 The price level
The central bank conducts monetary policy with the aim to stabilize ﬂuctuations in the
















itdi is the aggregate
eﬃcient level of employment in the economy at time t,a n dλ is the weight on deviations
in employment relative to deviations in the price level from their respective target levels.7
The central bank is assumed to have instantaneous control over the price level. At each
instant t ≥ 0, after having observed the realization of the productivity shock θt, the






subject to (2), (4), (5), and the deﬁnitions of lt and l∗










where b = λµ2/(1 + λµ2)a n dwt =
R
i witdi is the aggregate nominal wage at time t, which
is taken as given by the central bank. In response to a productivity shock, the price level
is moved in the opposite direction to stabilize employment. Moreover, the coeﬃcient b is
smaller that one, which means that the central bank only stabilizes productivity shocks
partially, and the reason for this is that ﬂuctuations in the price level are costly. The
amount of stabilization b is increasing in the weight on employment ﬂuctuations relative
to price level ﬂuctuations, λ.8
2.4 The labor market
2.4.1 Unions
Labor is organized in one union confederation and at each ﬁrm there is a local union
branch. This means that there is a continuum of union branches deﬁn e do nt h ei n t e r v a l
7With this speciﬁcation of the loss function, the central bank cares about ﬂuctuations in aggregate
employment around the aggregate eﬃcient level. This yields the same decision rule as in the case when
the central bank cares about the integral over the deviations of employment from the eﬃcient level of
each individual ﬁrm.
8There are no demand shocks in the model. However, including demand shocks do not matter for
the results, since the central bank will fully stabilize demand shocks and thus leave the price level and
contract length unaﬀected.
60 <i≤ 1, and below, we shall order them according to their ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity
level, qi. The union confederation can choose to set wages on diﬀerent levels, for instance
at ﬁrm-, industry- or nation-wide level, and the level at which wages are set will determine
the degree of centralization of wage setting in the economy. When choosing the level at
which wages are set, the union confederation minimizes a loss function that covers all
local union branches belonging to the confederation and once the wage-setting units have
been formed, a common wage rate is determined in each wage-setting unit.
To simplify the analysis, wage setting is assumed to be symmetrical, with all wage-
setting units of equal size. Further, the idiosyncratic component is observable and in the
coordination process, the wage-setting units are formed in such a way that the variance of
qi is minimized within each unit. This means that the local unions coordinate with those
which are closest to themselves on the unit interval, and this minimizes the eﬃciency loss
that arises from setting a common wage for each wage-setting unit.
We can now deﬁne c as the share of the union confederation that is organized in a
wage-setting unit. When c tends to zero, wage setting is fully decentralized, with wages
determined at each ﬁrm. When wage setting is fully centralized, wages are determined
economy-wide, and the wage-setting unit consists of the whole economy with c equal to
one.9
Finally, the wage-setting units are denoted by Ij with j =1 ,2,...,1/c,a n dw i t h1 /c
being the number of wage-setting units in the economy.10
The above is illustrated in Figure 1, where the idiosyncratic productivity level qi is
plotted against the union index. The ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity level qi is symmetric
around zero, strictly increasing in i, with c being the share of the economy organized in
the wage-setting unit Ij.
9This is of course a simpliﬁcation. In reality, not all union branches belong to the same union confed-
eration.
10For analytical simplicity, 1/c is treated as a continuous variable. In practice, it will be an integer.
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Figure 1: The labor market
2.4.2 Contract costs
Determining wages is costly and the contract cost K of each wage-setting unit is deter-
mined by
K = F + H(c,ρ), (8)
where F is a ﬁxed contract cost and H(c,ρ) is a variable cost, which depends both on
the size of the wage-setting unit, c, and the degree of heterogeneity, ρ.T h e ﬁxed cost
is independent of the level at which wage setting takes place and motivated by the fact
any negotiation can be seen to involve a certain degree of eﬀort (resources). The variable
part represents the idea that coordinationi ni t s e l fm i g h ti n v o l v ec o s t s .T h es p e c i ﬁcation
of the coordination cost is discussed and motivated in Appendix A.1, where it is shown




where α > 1a n dβ > 0, which implies that Hc > 0,H ρ > 0a n dHcc > 0. The speciﬁcation
implies that the coordination cost is convex in the degree of centralization, increasing in
the degree of heterogeneity, and equal across all wage-setting units (which have been
assumed to be of the same size).
3 Choice of contract length and the nominal wage
In the second stage of the game, the degree of centralization is given from the ﬁrst stage
and taken as exogenous by the wage-setting units when new contracts are signed. There
is synchronized wage setting and all contracts are signed at time t =0 . The contract of
wage-setting unit Ij speciﬁes the value of two parameters: The nominal wage wj0 and
8contract length xj0.11 Once contracts expire, new ones are renegotiated. In a symmetric
equilibrium, all wage-setting units will choose the same contract length xj0 = x. This
means that there is synchronized wage setting in any period, t ≥ 0. To simplify the
notation we shall therefore suppress the time subscript on contract length.
An optimal choice of the nominal wage and contract length minimizes the expected loss
per unit of time for the local unions belonging to wage-setting unit Ij. The expected loss
during a contract period is determined by the sum of (1) the deviations of employment
from the target level, which is equal to the eﬃcient level of employment and (2)t h e
contract cost, which is incurred at the time when the contract is being negotiated.12 This























where sub-index j refers to the wage-setting unit, while sub-index i refers to the local
union belonging to wage-setting unit Ij. The inner integral is the expected loss from
deviations of employment from target during the time of the contract for the local union
branch.13 The total loss is then the integral of the expected loss over all local unions
belonging to unit Ij, that is, for all i ∈ Ij.
3.1 The choice of an optimal wage
































 =0 . (10)
11The ﬁrst subscript refers to the wage-setting unit while the second refers to the time at which the
nominal wage and contract length are chosen.
12To justify the loss function in more detail, one can assume that workers are risk-neutral so that their
utility is equal to the consumer surplus. Contract signers are then assumed to maximize the sum of
expected proﬁts and the expected consumer surplus (the joint surplus). This is equivalent to minimizing
the expected reduction in the joint surplus from deviations of employment from the eﬃcient employment
level plus the contract cost. As shown in Appendix B.1, (lit − l∗
it)
2 is a second-order Taylor approximation
of the losses from deviations of employment form the eﬃcient level.
13Here, we assume that there is no breach of contract. This corresponds to the inclusion of a peace
clause which is common practice in most countries, as reported in SOU (1998).
9By using (2) together with (4) and (7) to get an expression for the squared deviation of













di =0 , (11)





[µ(bE0 [wt] − wj0)+k (1 − b)(lna + θ0)+kqi]fjtdt
¾
di =0 , (12)










The ﬁrst term in the parenthesis is the marginal eﬀect on the price level in period t of a
change in the individual wage wj0. This eﬀect works through the eﬀect on the aggregate
wage expected to prevail in period t. The second term is the marginal eﬀect on the
individual wage wj0. Thus, the inner derivative can be interpreted as the marginal change
in the individual real wage wj0 − pt expected to prevail in period t.
In the analysis below, we restrict ourselves to considering a symmetric Nash Equi-
librium, in which all wage-setting units choose the same contract length xj = x. The
wage-setting units choose the same contract length since they all face the same trade-oﬀ
between reducing contract costs, on the one hand, and increasing the intertemporal loss
from ﬂuctuations in employment around target, on the other hand. This means that at
any time 0 ≤ t ≤ x, the aggregate wage wt is equal to the aggregate wage implemented





By using this in (13), the inner derivative simpliﬁes to
fjt = µ(bc − 1).
Since fjt is a constant and equal across all wage-setting units, it does not aﬀect the ﬁrst-
order condition (12). When evaluating (12), we then use the feature that all terms can be
14Since xj and wj0 are chosen simulanously, xj is independent of wj0. This means that the derivative
can be evaluated within the integrals.
10treated as constants when evaluating the integral with respect to t. Moreover, all terms
except qi can be treated as constant when evaluating the integral with respect to i. The
ﬁrst-order condition can then be expressed as




Solving for wj0 gives




k(1 − b)(lna + θ0)+kqj
¤
, (15)
where qj =1 /c
R
i∈Ij qidi is the average value of the ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity level in
wage-setting unit Ij, discussed in Appendix A.1. Thus, the optimal wage wj0 depends
on θ0 since this is the expected value of the common productivity level during the time
of the contract, and on the average ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity level in unit Ij, since this
determines the expected loss from setting a common wage for the representative member
of the wage-setting unit. Moreover, it depends on the aggregate wage rate during the
time of the contract, w0, since this aﬀects monetary policy.








bw0k (1 − b)+( l na + θ0)+kqj
¤¾
.





(lna + θ0), (16)
w h e r ew eh a v eu s e dt h a tt h ee x p e c t e dv a l u eo fqi in the whole economy is equal to zero.








where the nominal wage depends on the common productivity level during the time of
the contract and on the average ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity level in wage-setting unit Ij.
3.2 The optimal contract length
The next step is to use the expression for an optimal wage to solve for optimal contract
length. By inserting (7), (16) and (17) into (2) and using the deﬁnition of l∗
it, the total
11integral over the squared deviation of employment from the target for wage-setting unit
























θ. The ﬁrst term is the intertemporal loss that
arises from increasing contract length and which results from the fact that the degree
of uncertainty regarding the level of productivity is increasing over time. Thus, longer
contract periods come at the cost of larger employment ﬂuctuations because the nominal
wage cannot be adjusted to unforeseen events during the contract period. The second
term is the atemporal eﬃciency loss that comes from the fact that a wage-setting unit sets
a single wage only. The atemporal loss is given by the term
R
i∈Ij (qi − ¯ qj)
2 di which, as
can be seen in Appendix A.1, is equal across all wage-setting units and equal to c3ρ2/12.
To solve for optimal contract length, expression (18) is inserted into the expected loss (9).
By evaluating the derivative with respect to x,w eg e tt h ef o l l o w i n gﬁrst-order condition































which is equal across all wage-setting units. The ﬁrst term corresponds to the per unit
of time savings on costs achieved by lengthening the contract. The second term is the
increased loss in the form of larger employment ﬂuctuations resulting from lengthening
the contract period. At the margin, the gains from lengthening the contract should equal
the expected loss.
After evaluating the integral and simplifying where we use (8) to substitute for K,t h e
optimal contract length can be represented by:
x =
s
2(F + H (c,ρ))




Here, we see that contract length depends on the trade-oﬀ between contract costs
(the numerator in (20)) and the increased intertemporal loss in terms of larger deviations
of employment from target, due to the preset nominal wage (the denominator in (20)).
Contract length does not, however, depend on the atemporal eﬃciency losses from imple-
menting a common wage rate in a wage-setting unit. The reason is that contract length
trades oﬀ variability over time against the contract cost for a given eﬃciency loss.
12The relation between x and c is important for the analysis and discussed in the fol-
lowing proposition:
Proposition 1 For a suﬃciently large ﬁxed contract cost F, contract length is u-shaped
in the level of centralization.
A proof of this proposition is included in Appendix B.2. The intuition behind the result
is that an increase in c has two eﬀects on contract length. One the one hand it reduces the
ﬁxed contract cost per union member, which makes it optimal to write shorter contracts.
One the other hand, an increase in c raises the coordination cost, which tends to give
longer contracts. At lower levels of centralization, the ﬁrst eﬀect dominates as long as the
ﬁxed contract cost is suﬃciently high. At higher levels of centralization, the second eﬀect
is stronger.
The following proposition relates contract length to the exogenous variables of the
model:
Proposition 2 An increase in λ increases the contract length. A higher ρ causes the
contract length to rise. An increase in σ2
θ decreases the contract length and ﬁnally, an
increase in the ﬁxed cost F causes the contract length to increase.
T h ed e r i v a t i v eo fx with respect to λ depends positively on k(1 − b)∂b/∂λ where
k (1 − b) > 0. A higher value of λ implies that the central bank stabilizes employment
to a larger extent, which means that ∂b/∂λ > 0, and thus the cost of preﬁxing wages
decreases. Hence, contract length increases. An increase in ρ implies that the coordination
cost, and thus the total contract cost rises, which strengthens the incentives to write longer
contracts. An increase in the ﬁxed cost F, also raises the total contract cost and thus also
causes x to rise. Finally, an increase in the variability of real shocks gives shorter contracts,
since preﬁxing wages becomes more costly in terms of larger employment ﬂuctuations.15
15This result is well established in the literature where it is shown that higher volatility, both in real
and nominal variables, causes shorter contract length (Gray, 1976, 1978; Calmfors and Johansson, 2001).
In a somewhat diﬀerent set-up by Danziger (1988), where ﬁrms are risk neutral and wage-earners are
risk adverse, there is a distinction between real and nominal shocks. It is shown that optimal contract
length is increasing in the variability of real shocks and decreasing in the variability of nominal shocks.
The intuition is that labor contracts are designed to allocate risk eﬃciently in order to reduce the impact
of uncertainty on risk-averse workers. During a contract period a ﬁrm may insure the workers, partially
or fully, against real shocks. However, when the contract expires, a new contract is negotiated and this
contract reﬂects worker productivity at the time of negotiation. This means that in the new contract
workers are exposed to the real shocks that occured within the previous contract period.
134 Choice of the degree of centralization
So far, the degree of centralization c has been treated as given. In the ﬁrst stage of the
game, centralization is optimally determined by the union confederation by minimizing
the aggregate loss for the work-force belonging to the union confederation. Thus, the





where 1/c is the number of wage-setting units in the economy and Lj is the expected loss
for wage-setting unit Ij evaluated under the optimal choice of xj and wj0. (9) together


















where x is given by (20). Since the expected loss is equal for all wage-setting units, (21)

























c2 =0 , (23)
w h e r ew eh a v eu s e dt h a t∂Lj/∂x = 0 at the optimal choice of x.16
A marginal increase in the degree of centralization has three eﬀects on the expected
loss. The ﬁrst term in (23) represents the fact that in larger wage-setting units, the degree
of heterogeneity in terms of the ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity parameter ρ is larger. Since all
members must agree on a common wage, this causes larger atemporal eﬃciency losses
in terms of a larger squared deviation of employment from the target. The second term
captures the fact that as centralization increases, the variable contract cost rises, which
causes a further increase in the expected loss. The third term ﬁnally captures the fact
that an increase in the degree of centralization decreases the contract cost per member of
the wage-setting unit, which decreases the expected loss.
16In appendix C.1, it is shown that there exists a unique solution to (23) satisfying the conditions for
a minimum.
145C o m p a r a t i v e s t a t i c s
The purpose of this section is to evaluate how the optimal level of centralization is aﬀected
by the parameters of the model. For proofs of the propositions, we refer to appendix D.1.
Proposition 3 An increase in the degree of heterogeneity, ρ, c a u s e st h ed e g r e eo fc e n -
tralization of wage setting to fall.
This is an intuitive result. There are two eﬀects at work. First, for a given level of
centralization, an increase in ρ causes larger deviations of employment from the target,
since more heterogenous labor has to agree on a common wage. Second, an increase in ρ
also increases the coordination cost, and makes it more costly for the local union branches
to come to an agreement on a common wage. Both eﬀects tend to reduce the optimal
degree of centralization.
Proposition 4 An increase in λ causes the degree of centralization of wage setting to
fall.
An increase in λ causes the central bank to stabilize employment to a larger extent.
This reduces the disadvantage following from employment variability of writing long con-
tracts, which leads to longer contracts. Hence the contract cost per unit of time is reduced.
This, in turn, causes c to fall, since it is less beneﬁcial to share the contract cost, when it
is smaller.
Proposition 5 An increase in the volatility of real shocks causes the degree of central-
ization of wage setting to increase.
The intuition behind this result is that an increase in the variability of real shocks
increases the cost of writing long contracts. Hence contracts become shorter and the
contract cost per unit of time increases. This makes it more advantageous to share
the cost between several local union branches, which implies that the optimal degree of
centralization increases.
Proposition 6 An increase in the ﬁxed contract cost has an ambiguous eﬀect on the
optimal degree of centralization of wage setting.
The eﬀect of F is ambiguous since the direct and the indirect eﬀects on c go in opposite
directions. An increase in F tends to make it more favorable to coordinate wage setting
at a higher level to divide the ﬁxed cost among more local union branches. Thus, the
direct eﬀect tends to increase the degree of centralization. But an increase in F also
causes contract length to increase, which means that the contract cost per unit of time
falls. This reduces the optimal degree of centralization. The outcome depends on which
of the two eﬀects that dominates.
156 Empirical results
The purpose of this section is to evaluate empirically the results regarding both contract
length and the degree of centralization of wage bargaining. The analysis is based on data
for 17 OECD countries for two time periods, 1975-1985 and 1986-1995.17
6.1 The data
There is a lack of cross-country data on contract length. We therefore use data by Bruno
and Sachs (1985) on the duration of nominal wages for 1975-85 and update the dataset
for 1985-95. Countries are classiﬁed according to the average duration of nominal wage
contracts, both across the economy and across time. The data is then grouped into
an index, which can take three values: The value is 0 for the duration of nominal wage
contracts less or equal to one year, the value is 1 for the duration of nominal wage contracts
of one to three years and the value is 2 for duration of nominal wage contracts equal to
or longer than three years. In what follows, this variable is denoted x.
As a measure of the degree of centralization, we use EMS by Elmeskov, Martin and
Scarpetta (1998). This is a pure measure of the degree of centralization of wage bargaining,
which classiﬁes countries into groups depending on whether wage bargaining is decentral-
ized (EMS=1), intermediate (EMS=2) or centralized (EMS=3). In the robustness checks,
we consider two alternative indices: ESUM by Elmeskov, Martin and Scarpetta (1998),
w h i c hi sas u m m a r ym e a s u r ew h e r et h ei n d e xo nc e n t r a l i z a t i o ni sc o m b i n e dw i t ha ni n d e x
on the degree of coordination of employers and unions, and OECD by OECD (1997),
which is a pure measure of centralization.18
One way of measuring the relative weight of employment stability in the central bank’s
preference function is to focus on the formal independence of the central bank. The idea
is that independent central banks are more conservative than political authorities in the
sense that they attribute more importance to the goal of price stability (for a discussion,
see e.g. Cukierman, 1992). One drawback of using such a measure is that it does not
take other means of achieving price stability into account. To account for this, we use a
composite measure of central bank independence, CBI, by Iversen (1998), which combines
a measure of central bank independence with a measure of the relative strength of the
17A summary of the industrial relations in the countries is included in Appendix E, and Table 1 provides
an overview of the data.
18OECD is available for three points in time: 1980, 1990 and 1994. We use the observations from 1980
for the ﬁrst period and those from 1990 for the second period. EMS and ESUM are available from the
1980’s, with indications when changes in the systems have occurred.
16currency. The measure of formal central bank independence is based on the three most
commonly used measures of central bank independence (Bade and Parkin, 1982; Grilli,
Masciandro and Tabellini, 1991; and Cukierman et al., 1992), and the hard currency
measure is based on average relative growth in nominal eﬀective exchange rates. The
combined continuous measure is normalized between 0 and 1 and is increasing in the
degree of conservativeness of the central bank, which means that CBI is decreasing in the
parameter λ in our model.19
As a proxy for ρ, which is the width of the distribution of the idiosyncratic productivity
component, the variable HET is used. In the model, capital is normalized to one. This
means that a straight-forward way of measuring labor productivity would be to calculate
value added per number of employed. In reality however, the size of the capital stock
varies, both over time and across industries. To control for the size of the capital stock, we
therefore calculate the productivity measure as the value added per number of employed
times the labor share of value added.20 HET is then constructed as the variance of the
productivity measure across industries in a given country, where the weight of a particular
industry is given by the percentage contribution of the industry in GDP. The data are
OECD data on value added in constant prices to the number of employed, the labor
share of value added and the share of GDP for industries classiﬁed by the ISIC code rev2
(OECD, 2000).
VAR is the variance of real shocks which, in the model, corresponds to unexpected
changes in labor productivity. This is a diﬃcult factor to measure, but changes in labor
productivity should aﬀect the level of real output. To calculate unexpected changes in
real output, we calculate the variance of real GDP relative to a trend, where trend output
has been estimated using a Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter, using quarterly IFS data on real GDP
(IMF, 2000). To control for possible endogeneity problems, the measure VAR is based
on historical data; that is, for the ﬁrst period (1975-1985), data from 1970 to 1980 is
used and for the second period, data from 1970 to 1990 is used.21 It is likely that VAR
19The original index is available for 15 OECD countries, and is updated for the remaining countries in
the data set (Australia and Spain). The index is available on a yearly basis for the time period 1973 to
1995 and averages have been created for the sub-periods 1973-1985 and 1986-1995.
20Assuming a Cobb-Douglas production function of the form F (L,K)=LαK1−α, the derivative
∂F (L,K)/∂L = αF (L,K)/L, which corresponds to our measure which is the labor share α times the
value added per number of employed F (L,K)/L.
21If data on individual wage agreements were available, the measure VAR should be calculated using
historical data up to the quarter before the wage contract was signed. Here, however, we only have
average data on contract length over a period of time. We therefore calculate VAR using data up until
the middle of the period.
Moreover, to calculate trend GDP, we use as much historical data as possible. Therefore, the starting
17captures demand shocks as well as productivity shocks. However, by looking at relative
output variability among countries it seems that diﬀerent types of supply shocks have
been the dominant source of ﬂuctuations in the economy (see e.g. Clarida and Gali, 1994;
Canzoneri et al., 1996; Thomas, 1997). The measure VAR can therefore be regarded as a
reasonable approximation of the variance of productivity shocks.
The model also predicts that ﬁxed contract costs should aﬀect the outcome. Under
the assumption that the ﬁxed contract cost mainly depends upon the legal system within
the country, a legal dummy could be used. Here we follow La Porta et al. (1999) and
divide the countries into four subgroups: Common law, German civil law, French civil
law and Scandinavian law (COM, GER, FRE, SCA).22 Another approach would be to
look at the ﬁxed contract cost as mainly culturally determined. However, the correlation
between the legal indices and cultural/geographical indices (Scandinavia, Anglosaxian
countries, Continental Europe, Mediterranean Europe, and Japan) is high, and the results
are unaﬀected to the speciﬁcation of the ﬁxed cost. We will therefore only report results
using the legal dummies.
A n o t h e rf a c t o rt h a tm a ya ﬀect the results is the size of the population. In the model,
the population size is normalized to one, while in reality, it diﬀe r sa c r o s sc o u n t r i e s .W e
therefore control for the size of the population, and the population variable is denoted
POP (OECD, 2001). There could also be more general time trends, such as trends towards
more decentralized wage bargaining and trends in population growth. To control for this,
we also include a time dummy, which is denoted TIME.
6.2 Data comments
The ﬁrst comment regards the sample size. The sample consists of 17 countries across
two periods of time, and data is missing for some of the variables, (see Table 1 in the
appendix). This means that the sample is small, and that the results have to be interpreted
with caution. In the study, the result will only be regarded as indicative.
Table 1 shows the data for the more important variables contract length (denoted
by x1 for period 1, x2 for period 2), the degree of centralization (EMS1 for period 1,
EMS2 for period 2), the degree of central bank independence (CBI1 for period 1, CBI2 for
point for calculating trend GDP is 1970 for both periods.
22In diﬀerent regions, diﬀerent types of law systems have developed. German, French and Scandinavian
law are all examples of civil law. This has developed as an instrument of the state in expanding its power.
It is largely based on created legislature and is focused on discovering a just solution to a dispute rather
than following a just procedure that protects individuals against the state. Common law, which is mainly
found in Anglosaxian countries, puts more emphasis on private rights of individuals.
18period 2), the variability of productivity across industries, (HET1 for period 1, HET2 for
period 2) and the variance of real shocks (VAR1 for period 1, VAR2 for period 2). The
variable contract length has 12 observations for short contracts (x = 0), 16 observations
for intermediate contract length (x = 1) and 6 observations for long contracts (x =
2). Further, there are 9 observations for decentralized wage bargaining (EMS = 1),
17 observations for intermediate wage bargaining (EMS = 2) and 6 observations for
centralized wage bargaining (EMS = 3). Thus, there are relatively few observations for
long contracts and centralized wage bargaining and this means that we have to be careful
in analyzing potential outliers driving the results.
6.3 The regression speciﬁcation
The ﬁrst-order conditions of the model they imply propositions 3 to 6 that relate the
optimal level of centralization to the exogenous variables of the model. This gives the
following empirical speciﬁcation
c = α0 + α1Y + ε1, (24)
where c is a measure of centralization, Y is a vector of exogenous variables, and ε1 is the
error term of the regressions.
Further, propositions 1 and 2 relate contract length to the level of centralization and
to the exogenous variables of the model. This gives the following speciﬁcation of the
regression equation:
x = β0 + β1c + β2c
2 + β3Y + ε2, (25)
where x is the duration of nominal wages. To allow for a u-shaped relation between x
and c, c2 is included in the regression.23
The empirical speciﬁcation of the structural model is a recursive system and under
the assumption that the error terms are not correlated, the single equation OLS generally
gives unbiased and consistent estimates of the structural parameters of the model.
However, we do not have data on neither contract length nor the degree of centraliza-
tion of wage bargaining. Instead, we have an index which maps the latent variable to an
observed ordinal measure which takes the form of an ordered index. Using OLS in such
case results in biased estimates and non-normal residuals. As an alternative, the model
can be estimated using maximum likelihood for the ordered probit model (for an overview,
23Due to the small sample, it is not possible to test the speciﬁc functional forms of the model. Rather,
the purpose is to test whether the implied derivatives of the model have the correct signs.
19see e.g. Greene, 1997; Long, 1997). However, the properties of consistency, normality and
eﬃciency for ordered probit models have been proven to hold in large samples. In smaller
samples, the behavior of the maximum likelihood estimator for these models is not well
known. Thus, there could be potential problems using ordered probit for a sample as
small as ours. We therefore choose to estimate the model using both estimation methods.
6.4 Regression results using OLS
In a ﬁrst set of regressions, propositions 1 and 2 are tested by estimating equation (25).
The results are reported in Table II. For a suﬃciently large ﬁxed cost of contracting, the
model predicts a u-shaped relation between x and c, which corresponds to a negative sign
on c and a positive sign on c2.24 As is clear from Table I, this is supported by data. More-
over, in the sample, there are countries where an increase in the degree of centralization
decreases contract length, and countries where an increase in the degree of centralization
increases contract length.25 The variables CBI and VAR both enter positively, which is
opposite to the theoretical predictions. HET does not enter signiﬁcantly. The ﬁto ft h e
regression is relatively high, explaining around 36 percentage points of the variation in
contract length. As a robustness check, we reestimate the model using the centralization
indices ESUM and OECD. The results are mainly robust to the choice of index. There is
somewhat less support for a u-shaped relation using the OECD index. Potential outliers
have been analyzed, and the results are not driven by outliers.
In a second set of regressions, propositions 3 to 6, which relate the optimal degree of
centralization to the exogenous variables of the model, are tested by running the regression
speciﬁed in (24). The results are reported in Table III in the Appendix. Using the
centralization index EMS, there is no support in favor for the main hypothesis that an
increase in the degree of heterogeneity decreases the degree of centralization. The legal
dummies explain a large share of the variation in EMS, indicating that in many countries,
the wage setting system seems to be determined by historical and regional factors and
that it cannot be chosen freely by the participants in the labor market, at least not in
the short run. Moreover, the population size enters negatively, indicating that it may
be easier to centralize wage bargaining in smaller countries. The results are somewhat
24The derivative of x with respect to c in regression (25) is equal to β1+2β2c and the second derivative
is 2β2. For x to be u-shaped in c, we need the second derivative to be positive and the ﬁrst derivative to
be negative for smaller values and positive for larger values of c. This corresponds to having β2 positive
and β1 negative.
25The derivative dx/d(EMS) = −2.47 + 1.22 ∗ (EMS). For a degree of centralization larger than two
(EMS > 2) the derivative is positive.
20modiﬁed using the ESUM and the OECD indices in that they support a negative relation
between HET and the degree of centralization. A possible explanation for the diﬀerence
is the construction of the centralization indices. The ESUM index incorporates the degree
of coordination of wage bargaining into a pure index of centralization. Countries with
an intermediate degree of centralization, scores high in the ESUM but not in the EMS
index. Moreover, the majority of these countries are relatively homogenous.26 The OECD
index also assigns a higher degree of centralization to a larger number of countries, and
this gives rise to a negative relation between the degree of heterogeneity and the degree
of centralization. The remaining results are robust to the choice of centralization index.
6.5 Regression results using ordered probit
The linear speciﬁcation in (24) and (25) relates a continuous dependent variable to the
explanatory variables of the model. We do not have data on the underlying latent vari-
ables, since the data is expressed as an index, which only takes on certain values. Using
ordered probit, the purpose is rather to estimate the implied cut oﬀ values, which translate
the underlying latent variable into an index. The probit model assumes that the latent
variable is a normally distributed random variable, so that the probability of observing a
particular value of the index can be calculated from the cumulative distribution function.
The model is estimated using a maximum likelihood method, in which the objective
is to ﬁnd the parameter estimators which maximize the likelihood that the index would
take on its particular values given the assumptions about the distribution of the latent
variable.
In a ﬁrst set of regressions, we estimate the relation between contract length x and the
set of explanatory variables. One of the explanatory variables, the degree of centralization,
takes the form of an index and, two dummy variables, c1a n dc3 are therefore created; c1
takes the value of one when EMS is equal to one, otherwise, it is zero, c3 is equal to one
when EMS is equal to 3. Otherwise, it is zero.
The results are reported in Table IV. Included in the table are the explanatory vari-
ables that enter signiﬁcantly. Using an ordered probit model, one has to be careful in
interpreting the coeﬃcients in the estimated regressions. The coeﬃcients do not represent
the marginal eﬀects as in the OLS model. Instead, the ordered probit model estimates the
predicted probabilities of observing a given outcome, conditional on the set of explana-
26For instance, Austria, Germany and Spain, (period 1) and, Austria, Germany, Netherlands and
Denmark (period 2) are classiﬁed as centralized using ESUM, while they are intermediate in the EMS
index. Out of these countries, four has a level of HET varying between 1.28 and 2.30.
21tory variables. The interpretation of the results will therefore be based upon predicted
probabilities.
To proceed, we calculate the probabilities of observing short, intermediate and long-
term wage contracts, given that the degree of centralization is low, intermediate and
high.27 The results are reported in Table V. On the horizontal axis, the duration of wage
contracts is indicated (short, intermediate and long-term contracts). On the vertical
axis, the degree of centralization is represented (low, intermediate and high degree of
centralization). It is clear that in intermediate bargaining systems, the probability of
observing short wage contracts is higher than in decentralized and centralized systems.
In decentralized and centralized bargaining systems, there is instead a higher probability
of observing intermediate to long-term wage contracts. This supports the predictions of
the model of a u-shaped relation between contract length and the degree of centralization.
The variable CBI enters signiﬁcantly and an increase in the degree of central bank
independence increases the probability of observing short contracts as shown in Table
VI, where on the horizontal axis, the duration of wage contracts is indicated (short,
intermediate and long-term contracts), and on the vertical axis, the degree of central
bank independence is represented (low and high degree of independence). This is in line
with the predictions of the model. The measure of productivity, VAR, enters signiﬁcantly
but only marginally aﬀects the predicted probabilities of observing contracts of diﬀerent
lengths. Thus, contract length tend to be unaﬀected by the variance of productivity across
time.
As a measure of ﬁt, we use pseudo-R2, which predicts that the model improves the
explanatory power with around 35 percentage points compared to a model which only
has a constant as independent variable.28 Finally, in a robustness check, we also ﬁnd that
these results are robust to the choice of centralization index.
Next, we estimate the relation between the degree of centralization and the set of
explanatory variables. None of the variables in the model enter signiﬁcantly (see Table
VII), while the legal dummies and the size of the population enter signiﬁcantly. There
27To calculate the predicted probability of observing a particular outcome, for a given value of one of
the explanatory variables (here, the degree of centralization), it is common to ﬁx all other explanatory
variables at their means, and then let the variable of interest vary. Here, this method is diﬃcult to use,
since many dummy variables enter as explanatory variables. Therefore, the predicted probabilities are
calculated as the means for the respective group, (here for countries with low, intermediate and high
degree of centralization, respectively) given the actual values of all other explanatory variables.
28Let L1 be the log likelihood of the full model and let L0 be the log likelihood of a model with a
constant only as independent variable. The pseudo-R2 is deﬁned as 1 − L1/L0, with 1 corresponding to
perfect ﬁt( w i t hL1 equal to zero), and 0 corresponding to no improvement in ﬁtc o m p a r e dt oam o d e l
with a constant only (L1 = L0).
22is also a signiﬁcant time eﬀect, suggesting that there is a lower probability of observing
a high degree of centralization during the latter period. The pseudo-R2 is 45 percentage
points.
In the robustness check, when using the ESUM index, the degree of heterogeneity
HET enters signiﬁcantly, with a higher degree of heterogeneity reducing the probability
of observing a high degree of centralization.29
To sum up, the empirical ﬁndings are relatively robust to the choice of estimation
method. The results support a u-shaped relation between contract length and the degree
of centralization. However, there is less support for a negative relation between the degree
of heterogeneity and the degree of centralization. The results regarding the other variables
(VAR and CBI) are less robust and in particular, depend on the estimation method.
7C o n c l u s i o n
The hypothesis in this paper is that the degree of centralization of wage setting is impor-
tant in determining contract length, and that the centralization level itself is a function
of the degree of heterogeneity in the economy.
Contract length is modelled as a function of contract costs, where the cost consists
of one ﬁxed and one variable part that depends on the degree of centralization. It is
shown that under reasonable assumptions, the variable part is convex in the degree of
centralization and increasing in the degree of heterogeneity. For a suﬃciently large ﬁxed
contracting cost, this yields a u-shaped relation between contract length and the degree
of centralization. Thus, intermediate wage setting systems tend to be more ﬂexible than
both centralized and decentralized systems.
The optimal degree of centralization is endogenized and modelled as a function of the
degree of heterogeneity. The model predicts a negative relation between these variables.
First, an increase in the degree of heterogeneity creates larger employment ﬂuctuations,
since more heterogenous labor has to agree on a common wage. Second, an increase in
the degree of heterogeneity increases the coordination cost, and makes it more costly for
the local union branches to make an agreement on a common wage. This tends to reduce
the optimal degree of centralization.
The predictions of the model are tested on a cross-sectional sample of 17 OECD coun-
tries, covering two periods of time. Due to the lack of cross-country data on the variables
29In the robustness check, only ESUM is used. The reason for this is that OECD has a ﬁner division
of the degree of centralization (with 6 subgroups). It can therefore be considered as approximatively
continuous and it is not used in the ordered probit regressions.
23included in the regressions, the results should be interpreted as mainly being indicative.
The empirical results, both using OLS and ordered probit estimation methods, support
a u-shaped relation between contract length and the degree of centralization, with inter-
mediate wage setting systems being more ﬂexible than both decentralized and centralized
systems. There is less evidence of the negative relation between the centralization level
and the degree of heterogeneity, something we interpret as a result of the fact that in
many countries, the wage setting system is to a large extent historically and culturally
determined, and cannot be chosen freely by the participants in the labor market, at least
not in the short run. This has not been incorporated in the model, where we consider the
unconstrained choice of centralization.
To sum up, we take a ﬁrst step towards endogenizing the contract cost, although
the wage setting process is still trivial. As an extension, the game between unions and
e m p l o y e r s ,o nt h eo n eh a n d ,a n dt h eg a m eb e t w e e nu n i o n sw i t h i nt h es a m ew a g e - s e t t i n g
units, on the other hand, could be modelled to further deepening the understanding of
wage setting and its implications on contract length and the degree of centralization.
Moreover, the driving force behind centralization in our model is the incentive to reduce
the ﬁxed contract cost per wage-setting unit. The model does not capture other reasons for
centralization, such as competition and internalization eﬀects, discussed in e.g. Calmfors
et al., (2001) and Flanagan, (1999).
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27AT h e m o d e l
A.1 The Coordination cost
An underlying assumption of the model is that the members of a wage-setting unit must
agree on a common wage. When agreement is costly, so that it takes time and resources
to reach a common agreement, it is plausible to assume that the coordination cost is
proportional both to the size of the wage setting group and the degree of heterogeneity
within the group. One measure representing the degree of heterogeneity is the variance








where qj ≡ 1/c
R
i∈Ij qidi is the average value of the ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity level in
wage-setting unit Ij and where 1/c is the density function of ﬁrms in group Ij.T os o l v e












for an arbitrary limit of integration φj and where the function −ρ/2+ρi maps ρ into i.
That is, for each i b e t w e e n0a n d1 , there is an associated productivity level qi that fulﬁlls
−ρ/2+ρi, where −ρ/2 is the productivity level for i =0a n dw h e r eρi is the increment
in the productivity level for member i ∈ (0,1). By solving for the above integral, we get
qj = −ρ/2+φjρ + ρc/2. (A2)
This states that the average productivity level in group Ij is equal to −ρ/2+φjρ, which
is the lowest productivity level within group Ij,p l u sat e r mρc/2, w h i c hi sh a l fo ft h e
distribution of the productivity level within the group.



















The coordination cost which is assumed to be proportional to the within-group vari-





28B Choice of contract length and the nominal wage
B.1 The loss function
Deﬁne the surplus function τ (lit) as the total consumer and producer surplus from having





































which gives the following value for τ (lit):






with the ﬁrst derivative τ0 (lit)=0a tt h ee ﬃcient level of employment l∗
it equal to
δµ/(δ + µ)(θt + qi +l na) and with the second derivative, τ00 (lit) < 0. Thus, the surplus
function takes its maximum value at the eﬃcient level of employment.
The loss from preset nominal wages can then be calculated as the diﬀerence between
the surplus with lit = l∗
it and the surplus with lit 6= l∗
it. The loss function is denoted by












dl =( θt + qi +l na)(l
∗












A second-order Taylor-approximation of f (lit)a r o u n dt h ee ﬃcient level l∗
it then gives the
following expression for the change in the surplus from preﬁxing the wage at a level other
than the eﬃcient one:














By deﬁnition of f (lit),f(l∗
it)m u s tb ez e r o .F u r t h e r m o r e ,f0 (l∗
it) = 0, since the function
f (lit) reaches its minimum at l∗
















cHc − H − F





From the assumptions about the coordination cost, cHc − H =( α − 1)H which is
positive, since α > 1. Furthermore, ∂ (cHc − H)/∂c = cHcc is positive since Hcc =
(α − 1)αcα−2ρβ. This means that for a suﬃciently large F, ∂x/∂c<0 at lower levels of
c.A f t e rac u t - o ﬀ point where cHc − H = F, ∂x/∂c>0.
C Choice of the degree of centralization
C.1 Existence of equilibrium to equation (23)
Rewrite equation (23) as
k2ρ2c3x
6
+ cHc − F − H =0 . (C1)
Fix all variables apart from c and denote the left-hand side of (C1) by f (c). The function
f (c)f u l ﬁlls f (0) = −F and ∂f/∂c = k2ρ2c2x/2+cHcc.S i n c e∂f/∂c is strictly positive for
any c greater than zero, there exists a unique equilibrium to (C1) which fulﬁlls f (c)=0 .
The conditions for a minimum are fulﬁlled, since ∂f/∂c>0 at an optimum choice of
c.
DC o m p a r a t i v e s t a t i c s
D.1 Proofs of propositions 3 to 6
Equation, (20) and (23) can be rewritten as the following implicit equations:
k




2 − 2F − 2H =0 ( D 1 )
k2ρ2c3x
6
+ cHc − F − H =0 . (D2)
Start by looking at the case dc/dρ. Total diﬀerentiation of (D1) and (D2), holding F, σ2
θ



















dx + cHccdc + cHcρdρ − Hρdρ =0 . (D4)
30By solving for dx from (D3), we get
dx =
2(Hcdc + Hρdρ) − k2 (1 − b)
2 σ2
θx2dc




By inserting the expression for dx into (D4), we can now evaluate the diﬀerentiate of c




















The denominator is positive so that the sign of this expression is determined by the
numerator. Under the assumptions about the coordination cost H (c,ρ)=cαρβ with
α > 1a n dβ > 0, the term Hρ − cHcρ is negative and equal to cαρβ−1β (1 − α). This
means that the total derivative is negative.
To ﬁnd dc/dλ, we diﬀerentiate (D1) and (D2), holding F, σ2
θ and ρ constant, which
gives
2k




















dx + cHccdc =0 . (D7)

















where db/dλ > 0. Thus, dc/dλ < 0.
Similarly, totally diﬀerentiating (D1) and (D2) to ﬁnd dc/dσ2
θ,h o l d i n gF, ρ and λ
constant gives the following expressions
2k



















dx + cHccdc =0 . (D10)

















31Finally, diﬀerentiating (D1) and (D2) with respect to F, x and c to ﬁnd dc/dF gives the
following equations:
2k














dx + cHccdc − dF =0 .
















where the sign depends on the relative size of two opposite eﬀects.
E Industrial relations since 1985
E.1 Austria
Austria’s political system is among the most corporatist of the western countries, based
upon close cooperation between state, capital and labor. Unionism is highly centralized
and the Austrian Trade Union Federation encompasses the country’s entire unionship
and consists of 14 aﬃliates which cover the whole economy. Collective bargaining is
highly inclusive (90% of the employees), conducted at lower bargaining levels, but with
strong macro-economic coordination. Bargaining is synchronized, and contract duration
is normally between 8 and 12 months.30
E.2 Australia
Up until 1987, industrial relations were characterized by centralized wage ﬁxing. The
Industrial Relation Act of 1988 provided scope for agreements outside the national wage
principles, and a trend towards decentralization began. Unions are rather weak, with
union density around 30%. Legislation has reduced the power of unions and new changes
in the legislation are under way. The average contract duration has increased from 10.4
months in 1992 to 15.8 months in 1994.31
30The material has been collected from Ferner and Hyman (1998), OEGB (1999) and SOU (1998).
31Hunt and Provis (1995).
32E.3 Belgium
The Belgian system is characterized by a pattern of intersectorial agreements covering the
entire private sector. The agreements provide the framework for employment policy over
the subsequent 2-year period and are known as ”social planning” agreements. There is
a highly institutionalized pyramid of negotiations with the central agreement, initiating
intersectorial, sectorial and company-level collective agreements. Wages are automatically
linked to inﬂation.32
E.4 Denmark
Since the 1980s, there has been a trend from national multi-industry bargaining to national
single-industry bargaining, with collective bargaining covering 70% of the work force.
Bargaining is highly synchronized and takes place every second year. For the remaining
period, agreements are implemented and no bargaining takes place. There is also an
element of pattern bargaining, with one of the unions (usually metal workers) setting the
pace for the others.33
E.5 Finland
The Finnish system increasingly resembles the Scandinavian model, with a very high cov-
erage of collective agreements (95%). Its most notable feature is the importance of cen-
tralized national agreements between the confederations of employers and unions. There
is a strong political element in the system of collective bargaining, with the government
facilitating agreements by promising measures such as tax reforms and changes in the
labor law. The system is biased towards political compromise and consensus. Contracts
are usually signed for 2-3y e a r s .34
E.6 France
In France, industrial conﬂict and legal intervention, rather than collective bargaining,
has characterized industrial relations. There are strong links between political parties
and unions, and trade unions are characterized by fragmentation, rivalry and low union
density. The French state has tried to incorporate unions by treating them as partners,
and it has used legal intervention to compensate for their organizational weakness. The
32Ferner and Hyman (1998).
33Ferner and Hyman (1998) and SOU (1998).
34Ferner and Hyman (1998) and SOU (1998).
33collective bargaining system is structured around the three levels of multi-industry, in-
dustry and company bargaining where company bargaining has become the key factor
in regulating industrial relations. Multi-industry agreements set the framework within
which negotiations take place and there is a statuary obligation to negotiate annually.35
E.7 Germany
The most important part of the German model is the dual structure of interest repre-
sentation. Unions and employers’ associations are responsible for collective bargaining,
usually at the sectorial and the regional level; work councils and management for relations
at the company level. Collective bargaining is relatively centralized and policies are coor-
dinated at the sectorial level; Pilot agreement in key industries (the metal sector) set the
standard for the other industries and although sectorial bargaining is usually undertaken
at the regional level, it is centrally directed by the national organizations. In the past, the
majority of contracts were one-year contracts. German employers try to promote longer
contracts, and in 2000, most contracts lasted for two years.36
E.8 Ireland
Collective bargaining is at the center of the Irish system of industrial relations. Most
workers have their terms and conditions of employment settled by collective agreements,
and it has been long-term public policy to support this system, which is inﬂuenced by cor-
poratist tendencies. In the 1970s, national wage agreements covering the whole workforce
were negotiated. In the 1980s, there were no centralized agreements, but negotiations
were still coordinated with a norm setting the standard for the negotiators. Since 1987,
there has been a return to national agreements and the period has been characterized by
national agreements with a duration of three years.37
E.9 Italy
In Italy, trade unions are less regulated than elsewhere in Europe and until 1990, strike
action was almost unconstrained by law, which resulted in a large number of strikes. The
1946 agreement on indexing wages to the cost of living every three months has been a key
element of industrial relations in Italy. This agreement was nulliﬁed in 1991 and replaced
35Ferner and Hyman (1998).
36Confederation of German Employers (BDA) (2000), Ferner and Hyman (1998) and SOU (1998).
37Ferner and Hyman (1998) and SOU (1998).
34with a new system, providing for four-year contracts with a reopening clause after the
second year, to adjust wages to actual inﬂation.38
E.10 Japan
Labor-management relations in Japan have not changed signiﬁcantly in the last two
decades. The labor market is characterized by company-based unions, a seniority based
wage proﬁle and long-term employment with work force adjustments through internal
training and relocation. In the wage bargaining process, the ”spring labor oﬀensive” has
played an important role since 1955. Unions and employers negotiate every year, with
1-year contracts as the outcome. In the wage talks, negotiations are primarily conducted
between individual companies and their company-based unions. In this sense, wage talks
are decentralized. However, the process can be regarded as centralized in the sense that
both the union- and the employer side are strongly coordinated, with the same wage level
agreed in almost all industries.39
E.11 Netherlands
About 80% of the working population is covered by collective agreements. Until 1970,
collective bargaining was heavily centralized and government-inﬂuenced. Thereafter, sec-
torial and company bargaining became predominant, but the system still has a strong
element of coordination. Until 1982, most of the wage increment was determined by a
system of price indexation. As inﬂation rose, this system was abandoned for free negoti-
ations. The usual contract duration varies from 1t o2y e a r sand is freely determined by
the agreement.40
E.12 New Zeeland
Reforms in the labor market have been substantial since the mid-1980s. A new legal frame-
work, the Employment Contracts Act, was introduced in 1991 and a highly decentralized
wage-bargaining system has replaced a complex system of industry-wide bargaining. The
coverage of collective bargaining has subsequently fallen by half, to around 40% of the
working population, and union density has fallen from around 45% to 30% of the work
38Ferner and Hyman (1998).
39Inoue (1999).
40Confederation of Netherlands Industry and Employers (VNO) (2000), Ferner and Hyman (1998) and
SOU (1998).
35force. Between 1993 and 1995, the average duration of contracts was 3.8 quarters.41
E.13 Norway
Union density is lower in Norway than in the other Scandinavian countries, partly because
unemployment insurance is provided by the state and not by the unions. Since 1987, there
has been a reintroduction of income policies and a re-centralization of collective bargain-
ing, which covers around 70% of the working population. Collective bargaining does not
only cover pay and working conditions, but also broader issues of social policies, such as
pension rights and sickness beneﬁts. Negotiations are highly coordinated, and since 1968,
there have been bargaining rounds every two years.T h e r ei sa l s oarenegotiation clause
that opens for renegotiations after 12 months.42
E.14 Spain
The Spanish system resembles the French case, with close links between unions and po-
litical parties, legally extendable collective agreements, representation in tripartite bodies
and other measures that have allowed the union movement to consolidate but, at the same
time, have weakened their independence. Around 90% of the working population are cov-
ered by collective agreements and the annual process of collective bargaining is relatively
centralized and directed from the central employers’ and unions’ organizations. Lately,
major reforms have taken place which increase the scope of local negotiations between
employers and employees. The average term of agreements is 27 months.43
E.15 Sweden
The Swedish model has traditionally been characterized by high union density and a high
coverage of collective agreements. There has been a combination of decentralization and
centralization of wage bargaining in a self-regulated system, where government interven-
tion has been rare. One recent tendency is the continued advance of decentralization,
with an increase in the scope of work place negotiations within the framework of industry
agreements. Both the synchronization and the duration of contracts have been highly
coordinated in the 1990, with a contract length of 2-3y e a r s .44
41Chapple (1996), New Zeeland Council of Trade Unions (2000) and OECD (1998).
42Confederation of Norwegian Business and Industry (2000), Ferner and Hyman (1998) and SOU
(1998).
43Ferner and Hyman (1998) and CEOE (1999).
44Ferner and Hyman (1998) and SOU (1998).
36E.16 Switzerland
The Swiss system is characterized by a structure of social partnership dating back to the
1930s. Neither the right to collective organization nor the right to strike is included in
the Swiss constitution and unions are relatively weak. Employment relations have been
classiﬁed as liberal corporativism, with the corporatist arrangements found at the sectorial
level. The principal instrument of employment is the sectorial agreement (GAV), which
lasts for 3t o5y e a r s , supplemented by annual negotiations to adjust wages to the cost
of living. By law, agreements only cover union members, but non-union employees are
usually treated the same way as union members.45
E.17 The UK
The period since 1979 has been characterized by the longest recorded decline in trade
union membership and a fall in strike rates to their lowest levels ever. Since the mid-
1980s, the changes have been accompanied by a strong decline in the role of collective
bargaining. There has been a trend from multi-employer to single-employer bargaining
and pay systems have been oriented towards company performance. In 1990, half of the
private sector’s employees were covered by collective agreements and out of these, most
were single employer contracts.46
E.18 The US
In the US, unions have traditionally been weak with collective agreements covering only
20% of the labor force. Up to the 1980s, so-called pattern bargaining at the industry
level was common but today, negotiations usually take place at the company level. Con-
tract duration has traditionally been long in the US, earlier averaging 3y e a r s , but lately
increasing to 5-6 years.47
45Ferner and Hyman (1998).
46Ferner and Hyman (1998) and SOU (1998).
47SOU (1998).
37Table I: The data
x1 x2 EMS1 EMS2 CBI1 CBI2 HET1 HET2 VAR1 VAR2
Australia 0 1 2 1 0.38 0.46 0.79 1.22 0.69 2.83
Austria 0 0 2 2 0.60 0.57 2.89 9.81 1.20 1.05
Belgium 0 1 2 2 0.30 0.36 6.18 8.26 - 0.69
Canada 1 1 1 1 0.41 0.46 1.67 6.38 0.52 0.90
Denmark 0 1 3 2 0.38 0.44 1.05 1.28 - 0.93
Finland 1 1 3 2 0.31 0.32 1.17 1.43 1.58 1.44
France 1 0 2 2 0.27 0.37 1.76 2.94 0.74 2.88
Germany 0 1 2 2 0.79 0.80 1.80 3.83 0.89 0.91
Italy 2 2 1 3 0.07 0.13 1.27 3.85 1.05 1.00
Japan 0 0 1 1 0.46 0.56 2.74 11.51 1.05 0.94
Netherlands 0 1 2 2 0.49 0.49 2.19 2.07 0.50 0.98
Norway 1 1 3 3 0.25 0.25 1.49 6.64 1.05 1.32
Spain 1 1 2 2 0.26 0.36 2.30 7.11 0.81 0.67
Sweden 1 1 3 2 0.26 0.25 0.78 5.86 1.25 1.34
Switzerland 2 2 - - 0.87 0.74 - - 1.87 1.64
UK 0 0 2 1 0.25 0.25 3.19 6.82 0.93 1.03
US 2 2 1 1 0.63 0.55 1.83 9.78 0.88 1.06
Mean 0.71 0.94 2 1.81 0.41 0.43 2.07 5.55 1.00 1.27
Min. 0 0 1 1 0.07 0.13 0.78 1.22 0.50 0.67
Max. 2 2 3 3 0.87 0.74 6.18 11.51 1.87 2.88
Table I: The data
ESUM1 ESUM2 OECD1 OECD2
Australia 2 1 2.25 1.5
Austria 3 3 2.25 2.25
Belgium 2 2 2.25 2.25
C a n a d a 1111
D e n m a r k 332 . 2 5 2
Finland 3 2 2.5 2.25
France 2 2 2 2
G e r m a n y 3322
I t a l y 131 . 7 5 2
J a p a n1111
Netherlands 2 3 2 2
N o r w a y 3322 . 5
S p a i n322 . 2 5 2
S w e d e n 3232
Switzerland - - 2 2
U K 2121 . 5
U S 1111
Mean 2.2 2.1 2 1.8
M i n . 1111
Max. 3 3 3 2.5

























Standard errors are reported in the parenthesis
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Low degree of centralization is when EMS=1, intermediate when EMS=2 and high when EMS=3








Low degree of central
bank independence
0.27 0.62 0.11
High degree of central
bank independence
0.44 0.41 0.16
The cut-off value for low versus high degree of central bank independence is 0.45.



















Standard errors are reported in the parenthesis
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